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RECENT CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law - Corporations - Taxation of
Interstate Commerce
The state of Minnesota brought suit against a foreign corporation
to collect income taxes. In another action a foreign corporation
brought suit against the State Revenue Commissioner of Georgia to
recover income taxes paid by the corporation under protest. In both
actions, the activity of the foreign corporation (not licensed to do
business within the taxing state) was exclusively interstate, and the
tax thereon was imposed upon the net income of the foreign corpora-
tion derived from interstate business within the taxing state. The tax-
ing formulas were based upon that part of the corporation's total
sales, tangible property, and payrolls, which existed within the tax-
ing state. Held: Neither the commerce clause nor the due process
clause of the federal constitution is violated by a non-discriminatory,
properly apportioned state tax on net income from interstate opera-
tions of a foreign corporation, provided there is a "sufficient nexus"
between the tax and the local activities of the corporation within the
taxing state to support the tax. Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota; Williams v. Stockman Valves & Fittings, Inc.,
358 U. S. 450 (1959).
A state tax cannot constitute a direct restriction upon interstate
commerce,' nor be discriminatory, favoring purely local or intrastate
activity,' nor be a tax upon the privilege of carrying on interstate
commerce. Moreover, "multiple taxation" of interstate commerce,
i.e., taxation of the same commerce by more than one state,
may be discriminatory, since local commerce is not exposed to
the same burden." However, property of an interstate corporation
may be taxed by the state in whose jurisdiction the property lies,'
and non-discriminatory sales taxes on interstate transactions involv-
ing tangible personal property, have been held not to infringe upon
'Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887); see Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
'Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Nippert v.
City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954); Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
' Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954); Gwin, White &
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U.S. 307 (1938).
'Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933); Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. City of Little
Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919).
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the commerce clause! Moreover, a state properly may tax a cor-
poration licensed to do business within the taxing state on dividends
made payable to its stockholders that are derived from income attri-
butable to the corporation's activities within the taxing state.' How-
ever, before any tax upon interstate commerce can be constitutional,
the apportionment formula used must be reasonably related to the
local activities of the taxpayer.8
In the Railway Express case, decided on the same day as the princi-
pal cases, the Court held that a tax on a foreign interstate express
company, measured by gross receipts from operations within the tax-
ing state and imposed in lieu of all other property taxes was valid.'
Prior to this case it had been held that a franchise or excise tax cannot
be imposed on a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce," but a franchise tax upon a foreign corporation doing
some intrastate business has been upheld.1' Further, a franchise tax
measured by capital assets within the state may, in place of a proper-
ty tax, be enforced against a foreign corporation engaged exclusively
in interstate commerce."
A net income tax upon the interstate business of a domestic cor-
poration is constitutional if it is only an incidental burden on inter-
state commerce,"5 but a tax on gross proceeds from the interstate
business of a domestic corporation, or a foreign corporation licensed
to do business within the taxing state, is unconstitutional as a direct
burden on interstate commerce." The theory of the distinction
between a tax on gross income and one on net income is that a tax
on gross income would be levied whether or not the business made a
profit, whereas a tax on net income only affected a business if it
'McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); Wiloil Corp.
v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935).
7 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
'International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947); Western Livestock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283
U.S. 123 (1931).
"Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
"°Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Ozark Pipe
Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925); Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S.
147 (1918).
"International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U.S. 429 (1929).
"1Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
Adams, 155 U.S. 688 (1895).
"International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947); Memphis Gas Co. v.
Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113
(1920); United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918); Peck &
Co. v. Collector, 247 U.S. 165 (1918).
"Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947); Crew Levick Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917); see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert,
347 U.S. 157 (1954).
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made a profit from the interstate commerce."5 In Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Conner,s a non-discriminatory franchise tax
was imposed upon a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in in-
terstate commerce for the privilege of carrying on business within
the state. The tax, based upon that part of the corporation's net
income which was reasonably attributable to its business activities
within the state, was held to be a tax upon the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce, and was declared to constitute a direct
burden on interstate commerce since there was no local incident
justifying the tax. However, the Supreme Court affirmed a Cali-
fornia decision permitting that state to tax the net income derived
from interstate commerce within California of a foreign corporation
not licensed to do business within California and doing no intrastate
business."
The Court in the principal cases reasoned that businesses operating
in interstate commerce should pay their fair share of the costs of the
state government in return for the benefits they derive from within
the taxing state."8 This reasoning is consistent with the principle of
taxing interstate income of domestic corporations, viz., that the test
for the validity of the tax imposed is the relationship between the
commercial activity and the privileges and protections provided by
a taxing state, coupled with the prohibitions against discrimina-
tion in favor of local commerce.' 9 Although a tax substantially the
same as the one in the instant case, i.e., upon net income, has been
upheld,2 0 a similar tax was struck down as a burden upon interstate
commerce, since it taxed the "privilege" of conducting interstate
business." The distinction between the instant cases and also the
West Publishing case' and the Spector case may lie in the fact that
the statute involved in the Spector case specifically stated that the
tax was for the "privilege of carrying on . . . business within the
state ... ,2' This distinction may be a false one since, in reality,
a tax was levied upon the net income of a foreign corporation en-
'"United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918); Note, 57
Mich. L. Rev. 903 (1959).
" Cases cited note 3 supra.
"
7 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal.2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, aff'd per curiam,
328 U.S. 823 (1946).
s 3;8 U.S. at 461-62.
", Cases cited note 13 supra.
2 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal.2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946), aff'd per
curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
" Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).2
1West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal.2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946), aff'd per
curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
'"Conn. Gen. Stat. tit. 12 § 214 (1958).
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gaged in interstate commerce in all three cases. Accordingly, if the
doctrine of the Spector case is considered to be valid, the validity of
a state's tax upon the interstate operations of a foreign corporation
may well depend upon the manner in which the language in the
statute is phrased."4 If the tax is levied upon net income derived
from within the state (assuming a proper apportionment formula)
it will be upheld under the doctrine of the instant cases,"5 but if the
same tax is cast in terms of a "privilege to do business," the doctrine
of the Spector case will invalidate it."6
The instant cases raise the problem of what will meet the require-
ment of what the Court terms a "sufficient nexus." Precedent in the
field of substantive jurisdiction over the person of a corporation
may guide courts in determining whether there is sufficient activity
within the taxing state to support the tax. However, it may be ques-
tionable whether sales solicited by traveling salesmen and mail order
businesses will form the requisite "sufficient nexus." Another prob-
lem presented by the decision is a determination of what will be a
fair and reasonable apportionment formula to avoid discrimination
and multiple tax burdens. It is believed that the standardization of
an apportionment formula among the states would solve most of
the problems in apportionment as well as prevent any multiple
taxation. This standardization could be accomplished by reciproc-
ity (either by statute or agreement) among the states, or by
congressional action under the federal government's power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce. Further, it may be argued that the de-
cision will place a burden on free commerce by requiring small and
medium-size businesses to keep financial records of their interstate
business. The answer to this argument is that, since all businesses to-
day are required to keep complete records, the added burden of
separate records on interstate business may be only slight. Paramount
in the face of these difficulties lies the equity that interstate business
should pay its fair share of the costs of the state government in
return for the benefits it derives from within the state. The commerce
clause was not intended to give interstate commerce a competitive
advantage over intrastate commerce, but only to prevent intrastate
commerce from discriminating against interstate commerce.
Lawrence E. Steinberg
24 See Note, supra note 15.
"
5 See also West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal.2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946),
aff'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
26 See 358 U.S. at 458.
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Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech - Motion
Picture Censorship
Petitioner, a distributor of motion picture films, was denied a li-
cense to exhibit publicly the film "Lady Chatterly's Lover" under
a statute which precluded licensing of films portraying "acts of sex-
ual immorality ... as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of be-
havior."' Held: The constitutional guaranties afforded by the first
amendment (which rights are protected from state infringement by
the fourteenth amendment) are not confined to the expression of
conventional ideas, and advocacy of conduct proscribed by law is no
justification for denying free speech when such advocacy falls short
of incitement to act. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the
Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
The freedoms of speech and press are shielded by the first amend-
ment against federal governmental invasion,' and are among the fun-
damental personal rights and liberties protected against state in-
fringement by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
However, the freedoms of speech and press are not absolute and un-
qualified rights, 4 and a state, pursuant to its police power, may enact
regulations which limit freedom of speech in order to promote the
general welfare,' as well as to promote and advance public morals.'
Nevertheless, the power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and
press is rarely upheld; thus a state legislature may not, under the
guise of its police power, arbitrarily or unnecessarily interfere with
either freedom.' Moreover, an otherwise valid state statute must not
be vague as to its specific prohibitions and standards for determina-
tion.'
The Mutual Film case,' the first Supreme Court decision to deter-
mine the constitutionality of motion picture censorship, upheld the
'N.Y. Educ. Law S 122 (1953).
2Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
.Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)(dictum).4 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986
(9th Cir. 1948).
'Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
6Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).7 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949).
'E.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
'Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). It must be
noted that this case concerned a freedom of speech protection of a state constitution. Since
it was decided before Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (dictum), the first
amendment at this time was not enforceable against the states via the fourteenth amendment.
[Vol. 14
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denial of a license to a film distributor upon the basis of the inter-
state commerce clause and rejected the contention that motion pic-
tures were within the protection of the first amendment freedom of
speech. Although this case established a widely-followed constitution-
al pattern, it has now been overruled by the Burstyn case." In retro-
spect, it would appear that such a reversal was inevitable due to a
changing constitutional climate which produced two general stand-
ards for evaluating freedom of speech censorship.1' One of these
standards, formulated by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Schenck case,"
is whether the words used were of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil which Con-
gress intended to prevent. However, it must be noted that this doc-
trine has not received express application by the Court so as to justi-
fy a restraint upon communication dealing with sex.' The other
standard, "the reasonable man test," asks whether a reasonable man,
when confronted with a statute alleged to infringe civil liberties,
could have reached the legislature's conclusion as to the existence of
a danger demanding that protective action be taken." Moreover, in
the interim between the Mutual Film and Burstyn cases, two im-
portant decisions strengthened the anti-censorship views. The first
of these espoused the idea that prior restraints" were always illegal."
The second made it clear that motion pictures, like newspapers and
radio broadcasts, were to be included within the protections afforded
by the first amendment." A more recent case, Roth v. United States,"'
has provided a third test for ascertaining the constitutionality of
free speech censorship. In this case it was held that obscenity is not
"speech" within the meaning of the first amendment and therefore
"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
"See Nimmer, The Constitutionality of Official Censorship of Motion Pictures, 25 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 625 (1958).
"Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); accord, Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957).
"Comment, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 337, 344 (1959).
"*See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court 28 (1954).
" Whereas prior restraint prevents the questionable medium of speech or press from
ever reaching the public (generally by means of a licensing system), the doctrine of sub-
sequent punishment imposes penal sanctions only upon the occurrence of an actual viola-
tion. Compare Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (requirement of special license for
sound trucks held invalid), with Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (subsequent pun-
ishment for making "loud and raucous noises" upheld).
" Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); but see Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957) (limitation).
" United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). In effect, this decision
overruled that part of the Mutual Film case which held that motion pictures were not
within the protection of the first amendment.
" Cases cited note 4 supra.
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the dissemination of obscene material can be restrained or punished
without showing that dissemination would create a clear and present
danger. 9 Accordingly, state regulation of communication that is
not based on one of these grounds (the Roth holding or the clear
and present danger test) is unconstitutional unless the restriction
relates to how, when, or where the communication is made rather
than to its contents.20
Unfortunately, other than overruling the Mutual Film decision,
the Court in the Burstyn case (censorship of sacrilegious material
not permitted) failed to pronounce a precedent-setting standard
for future comparison since the Court did not clarify whether its
holding was based on procedural due process (i.e., "sacrilegious" is
too vague a term) or upon a violation of the substantive rights in-
cluded within the meaning of free speech (i.e., "sacrilegious" failed
to reflect a subject matter which permits the state's police power to
infringe upon free speech)." Further, no Supreme Court decision
since the Burstyn case has upheld a ban on a motion picture." In
three of the four such cases decided since that time, the Court (by
per curiam memorandum decisions) apparently based its decisions
on the vagueness issue. Only the fourth seems to be based on the
freedom of speech protection of the first amendment.24 In regard
to the Court's failure to clarify its substantive position, writers
hoped that the next opinion on the subject would take a more ob-
jective approach;" however, such desires were unrealized in the in-
stant case. Nevertheless, the opinion in the principal case does make
two contributions: first, most of the Justices held that statutes
which speak in terms of "favorable portrayal of acts of sexual
immorality" are unconstitutional violations of the guarantee of
freedom of speech since they do not come within the "obscene ex-
ception" of the Roth case; and secondly, the implication is made
that the clear and present danger doctrine is applicable as a basis
for the regulation of motion pictures of content relating to sexual
activity." Still, fundamental dissension within the Court prevented
any uniform judicial interpretation. Thus, while some (Justices
354 U.S. at 485, 486.
20 Comment, supra note 13, at 339.
2 Casenote, 37 Texas L. Rev. 339 (1959).
22Casenote, 44 Cornell L.Q. 411 (1959).
23Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 346 U.S. 587
(1955) (two cases); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
1
4 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
2 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 11, at 636: "But, until the Supreme Court renders an-
other opinion in a motion picture case, (this) rationalization of the per curiam decisions is
at best a reasoned conjecture."
26 360 U.S. at 689.
[ Vol. 14
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Black, Clark, Douglas and Stewart) thought the statute itself was
unconstitutional, others (Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whit-
taker) agreed that the statute was constitutional but was uncon-
stitutionally applied to the facts. Further, there is complete lack of
agreement as to the constitutionality of prior restraints. Only Jus-
tices Black and Douglas expressly concluded that prior restraint per
se in the field of motion picture censorship is unconstitutional. 7
Thus, with five divergent concurring opinions, the instant case is
not extremely significant in setting forth strong judicial precedent
other than to demonstrate that within the present Court there are
strongly held but vastly contrasting opinions and no indications of
a compromise decision within the near future.
Mr. Justice Harlan (in his concurring opinion in the instant
case) s accurately pinpoints the problem of the future when he
states that unless the Court holds all censorship laws unconstitutional
(a course from which the Court now carefully abstains), the courts
must ultimately adjudicate the individual cases in this field on an
ad hoc basis. Assuming that the latter alternative (which Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan favors) is adopted by the Court, there must be some
indication as to whether the method of control will be prior re-
straint or subsequent punishment. Undoubtedly, if prior restraint
is permitted, it will necessarily be limited to state legislation clearly
based on the Roth "obscenity exception" or the clear and present
danger doctrine. There is another possible irreducible minimum pre-
requisite for motion picture censorship; viz., unless conduct seen
on the screen would, if seen in real life, constitute "indecent ex-
posure" (which is more capable of a precise standard), such con-
duct cannot be censored on the screen. Nevertheless, the additional
protection possibly afforded public morals by requiring the licensing
of all motion pictures does not justify the additional encroachments
of this prior restraint on freedom of speech inherent in any licensing
system, and subsequent punishment is definitely preferable. It must
be concluded that the instant case has given no support for either
of these alternatives and, considering the present improbability of
Supreme Court unanimity on the subject, if any clarification of the
law in this respect is forthcoming, it will be several years away.
Rice M. Tilley, Jr.
27 Id. at 690, 697. If a motion picture is "obscene," prior restraint would be per-
mitted since, under the Roth case, obscenity is not entitled to first amendment protection.
2' 360 U.S. at 708.
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Corporations - Stock Alienation Restrictions
- Power of Directors To Restrict Issued Stock
The directors (two-thirds stockholders) of D corporation passed
a bylaw giving the corporation the right of first refusal on all out-
standing, previously unrestricted stock. The price to be paid upon
exercise of this option was to be determined by independent apprais-
ers. On the basis of this new bylaw, all outstanding unrestricted
stock certificates were canceled and new stock certificates containing
the imposed restriction were issued in their place. P, a minority
stockholder of D corporation, refused to accept the new stock and
brought an action contending that the restriction imposed without
his consent was conversion of his stock. Held: The board of directors
of a corporation cannot via bylaw amendment restrict alienability
of previously unrestricted stock since the original issue creates a con-
tract between the corporation and the shareholder and the share-
holder has a "vested" right of free alienability. Sandor Petroleum
Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref.
n.r.e.
Corporate stock, as a form of personal property1 represented by
a stock certificate,' generally includes the right of free alienation.!
Early judicial opinion interpreted free alienation of corporate
stock to mean absolute and unrestricted disposition.' However, as
corporate law became more liberal, some limitations upon the free
transferability of stock were permitted,' e.g., a stockholder could be
required to give the corporation the first option to purchase the
stock.' These limited restrictions could be placed upon stock trans-
ferability through legislative act or amendment to the articles of in-
corporation.! The modern trend also permits restrictions by express
contract among the stockholders or by a corporate bylaw.' Generally,
all restrictions allow the corporate structure to regulate the admission
'Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957).
'Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 Harv. L.
Rev. 1369 (1956).
'Chouteau Spring Co. v. Harris, 20 Mo. 382 (1855).
'Note, 63 Dick. L. Rev. 265 (1958).
'Ireland v. Globe Milling & Reduction Co., 19 R.I. 180, 32 Atl. 921 (1895); Brink-
erhoff-Farris Trust & Say. Co. v. Home Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447, 24 S.W. 129 (1893).
8Douglas v. Aurora Daily News Co., 160 Ill. App. 506 (1911).
'Tracey v. Franklin, 30 Del. Ch. 407, 61 A.2d 780 (1948); Royal China, Inc. v.
Regal China Corp., 379 App. Div. 515, 304 N.Y. 309, aff'd, 110 N.Y.S.2d 718, 107 N.E.2d
461 (1952); Casenote, 23 Tul. L. Rev. 569 (1949).




of new stockholders, a power similar to the control of a partnership
over the admission of new partners."
Fundamentally, there are three prerequsites which must be met in
order for a corporation validly to restrict alienation of stock. 0 First,
where a person becomes a stockholder he is generally subject to the
statutes, charter, and bylaws existing at the time of incorporation,"
but if he is not notified or informed as to the restriction on aliena-
tion, such existing restrictions are not binding upon him." Thus, re-
strictions on the alienation of stock must be stated on the stock cer-
tificate itself in order to be valid,'3 on the theory that the stockhold-
er is "notified" of the restriction when it so appears. 4 Accordingly,
Texas requires that any restriction on alienation whether it is im-
posed by the charter or bylaws be stated either at length or in
summary form on the stock certificate" in order for it to be binding
upon innocent purchasers of the corporation's stock." Moreover,
the notice requirement is also the foundation for the "contract test"
for determining the validity of a restriction on the alienation of
stock." This test is based on the theory that an agreement exists be-
tween the stockholder and the corporation which fixes the rights of
the parties according to their "notice" of the restriction upon en-
tering into the contract." Second, a corporation must have the au-
thority to impose restrictions on the stock. In Texas this authority,
subject to the limitations of article 2.22B, is included in the authority
to make bylaws," which may be delegated by the shareholders to the
directors." The authority to adopt restrictions on alienation is im-
portant because it enables selective control of stock ownership." The
'Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957); Blooming-
dale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N.Y.Supp. 873 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Model Clothing
House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N.W. 957 (1920).
'0 Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 Va. L. Rev. 229
(1951).
" Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp.,
2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957); Casenote, 38 Va. L. Rev. 103 (1952).
"Mancini v. Setaro, 69 Cal. App. 748, 232 Pac. 495 (Dist. Ct. 1924); Annot., 61
A.L.R.2d 1318, 1327 (1958); Cataldo, supra note 10, at 251.
"Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 15 (Every state, including Alaska and Hawaii, has
either expressly adopted section 15 of the Uniform Act or incorporated its substance into a
statute); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.22A (Supp. 1958). See also note 16 infra.
"First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 34 Ohio Op. 359, 73 N.E.2d 93 (1945).
"Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.22A (Supp. 1958).
aTex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 1358(15) (1943) (adopted from section 15 of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act).7 Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951).
"SRoyal China, Inc. v. Regal China Corp., 379 App. Div. 515, 304 N.Y. 309, aff'd,
110 N.Y.S.2d 718, 107 N.E.2d 461 (1952).
'"Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.22A (Supp. 1958).
"Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.23 (Supp. 1958); Slover, Drafting Articles of Incorpora-
tion under the Texas Business Corporation Act, 8 Baylor L. Rev. 127 (1956).
'"Kretzer v. Cole Bros. Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S.W. 1066 (1916).
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third requisite is that the restriction must be reasonable and not con-
trary to public policy. Thus, an absolute restriction which cate-
gorically takes from the stockholder the right of transfer has been
uniformly held unreasonable." This third prerequisite is the basis for
the "reasonableness test" which places a greater emphasis on the rea-
sonability of the restriction rather than the contractual relations of
the shareholder and the corporation. 3 These three prerequisites, in-
cluding the "contract test" and the "reasonableness test", are mu-
tually dependent to such an extent that in practice they are generally
inseparable. 4
The court in the instant case, apparently the first to decide the
legality of imposing restrictions on alienation of previously issued un-
restricted stock, reasoned that a contractual relationship had been
established between the corporation and the shareholder when the
stock was issued; therefore, the right of free alienation implicit in the
original issue became vested and could not thereafter be infringed
through a bylaw amendment. s This reasoning is analogous to the
"vested rights" theory of accumulated but unpaid dividends on
cumulative preferred stock. " Courts adopting this theory hold that
the right of any preferred shareholder to accumulated but unpaid
dividends cannot be taken from him either by corporate action
through the board of directors, or by shareholder action through a
charter amendment. However, any formal merger may eliminate
these rights." One federal case applying Texas law has rejected this
"vested rights" theory, and the Texas Business Corporation Act
specifically permits elimination of accumulated but unpaid dividends
by charter amendment." Accordingly, since Texas has rejected the
concept of unalterable shareholder rights by contract in this ana-
logous situation, the reasoning that a right of alienation is vested and
thus, can never be subsequently restricted, may be regarded as ques-
tionable."
" Gould v. Head, 41 Fed. 240 (C.C.D. Colo. 1890); Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J.Eq.
597, 124 Atl. 118 (1924); Pelton v. Nevada Oil Co., 209 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Cataldo, supra note 10, at 233.
2 ee Huffman v. Sho-Me Power Co-op, 356 Mo. 832, 204 S.W.2d 276 (1947); An-
not., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958).
2 4 Dobry v. Dobry, - Okla. _, 262 P.2d 691 (1953).
2 See 321 S.W.2d at 618-19.
2' Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (1936).
27Consolidated Film Indus., Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 AtI. 489 (1937);
Keller v. Wilson & Co., supra note 26; contra, McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835,
54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945); see generally Lattin, Corporations 502-07 (1959).
2aFederal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940).
"
9Ainsworth v. Southwestern Drug Corp., 95 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1938).
"
0 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 4.01B (11) (Supp. 1958).
" But see Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951). Re-
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Moreover, the court in the instant case reasoned that even though
the Texas Business Corporation Act provides that an option of first
refusal may be imposed by the bylaws,"' that provision did not con-
template a subsequent bylaw amendment restricting alienability of
outstanding stock." Since courts have uniformly held that an option
of first refusal (with the price to be set by impartial appraisers) is
a reasonable restriction on alienation, 4 and since the act provides
that a corporation may amend its bylaws "not inconsistent with...
the laws of this state . . . ,"" this reasoning is less than convincing.
However, notwithstanding this reasoning of the court, it seems
that the stock could have been restricted validly by charter amend-
ment. The act provides that the articles of incorporation may be
amended "to change the . . . limitations and relative rights . . . of
all or any part of its shares . . . "" "so long as . . . the articles . . .
as amended contain only such provisions as might be lawfully con-
tained in original articles of incorporation . . . ,," Thus, since a cor-
poration may originally provide for an option of first refusal restrict-
ing the alienability of stock," it would seem that previously unre-
stricted stock could be restricted by charter amendment. The measure
of amendment is shareholder approval by two-thirds vote. There-
fore, the directors, as two-thirds stockholders, could have accom-
plished their desired result through amendment of the charter.
If the above action had been taken by the directors, acting as
shareholders, the court could still have reasoned that the act does not
contemplate this subsequent change even by charter amendment.
However, since somewhat more significance is generally given to
charter amendment than bylaw amendment, and since a vote of the
shareholders (two-thirds) would be required, the court could easily
have reached an opposite result. Therefore, the principal case should
be regarded as authority only for the proposition that the board of
directors may not by bylaw amendment restrict transferability of
previously freely alienable stock. Restricting the alienability of stock,
of course, has the greatest impact on closely-held corporations where
control of shareholder identity is or may be significant. On this basis,
strictions on stock cannot be eliminated by a majority of the shareholders via bylaw
amendment since the restriction was a binding contract.
"
3Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.22A (Supp. 1958).
3
aSee 321 S.W.2d 618.
"See, e.g., Coleman v. Kettering, 289 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
aaTex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.02A (13) (Supp. 1958).
aTex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 4.01B (7).
" Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 4.01A.
" Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.22B (3).
"'Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 4.02A; cf. art. 4.03.
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the opinion shows a general lack of insight into the fundamental re-
lationship between shareholder and corporation, and an unwarranted
strict construction of the Texas Business Corporation Act. If, under
Texas law, rights to accrued but unpaid dividends on cumulative
preferred stock may be eliminated by charter amendment, alienation
rights, being no more sacrosanct, should similarly be subject to rea-
sonable restriction subsequent to issuance of the stock.
Ronald Griesheimer
Criminal Law - Harmless Error - Jury Misconduct
D was convicted of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced to
thirty years in prison. After the jury retired, some jurors made state-
ments intimating that because of pardon, parole, or time off for good
behavior, D would serve only one-third of his sentence. On appeal,
D contended that consideration of the pardon and parole laws con-
stituted jury misconduct and reversible error. Held: Jury considera-
tion, during its deliberation, of the application of pardon and parole
laws is not reversible error when the information received is an ac-
curate statement of the law. Salcido v. State, - Tex. Crim. -, 319
S.W.2d 329 (1959).
It is well established in both civil and criminal cases that one seek-
ing reversal must show that he was probably harmed by error in the
trial court. No fixed rule may be utilized in finding prejudicial er-
ror in criminal cases;' but more caution must be exercised than in
civil cases before the courts are justified in finding error nonprejudi-
cial,' and any error in a criminal case, other than a minor, technical
one which does not affect the substative rights of an appellant, can-
not be disregarded.4
If, after retiring, a jury receives new evidence damaging to the
defendant a presumption of injury ordinarily applies,' but, if the in-
formation received relates to a question of the pardon and parole
'Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann., rule 434 (1955); Pena v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 311,
129 S.W.2d 667 (1939); Dakoff v. National Bank of Commerce, 254 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952) error ref.
'Deming v. State, 235 Ind. 282, 133 N.E.2d 51 (1955).
'State v. Collins, 249 Iowa 989, 69 N.W.2d 31 (1955).
4 State v. Nugent, 134 Iowa 237, 111 N.W. 927 (1907); see Hatley v. State, 151 Tex.
Crim. 280, 206 S.W.2d 1017 (1947).
aGilson v. State, - Tex. Crim. _ 145 S.W.2d 182 (1940); Pafford v. State, 138




laws, the presumption of injury may be inapplicable, and the test is
one of the accuracy of the information.6 Accordingly, the primary
question is whether the information received during deliberation was
untrue,7 even though in Roberson v. State the court held that untrue
information received by the jury regarding the parole laws was not
harmful. Following the Roberson decision, the court in Napier v.
State held that true information received was Per se not harmful.
Thus, while earlier cases apply the more prevalent test of whether
the information received caused substantial prejudice to the defend-
ant whether or not it was true,t0 recent cases apparently base the
test of harm upon the truth of the information received.1 If the in-
formation received is true, then the defendant is not harmed. 2 Con-
trary to the Roberson case quoted therein, it was held in Mays v.
State3 that the receipt of untrue information was per se harmful to
the defendant. In other cases the court has refused to instruct the
jury regarding the parole laws,' and it has also been held improper
for the attorneys to discuss the parole laws during the course of the
trial."
The court in the principal case articulates the rule promulgated in
Napier v. State," viz., if the information received is true, then it is
per se not harmful to the defendant. This reliance upon the truth of
the information received by the jury in determining whether the
defendant was prejudiced appears to be the result of dictum from
the Roberson case. The phrase "was untrue or was harmful," though
not in fact followed by the court in the Roberson case, has been re-
lied upon and extended in later cases.' This rule seems to be a de-
parture from the propositions that prejudice caused by the informa-
tion received is to be scrutinized carefully in criminal cases " and
'Cf. Mays v. State, - Tex. Crim. - 320 S.W.2d 13 (1959); Napier v. State,
Tex. Crim. - 314 S.W.2d 102 (1958).
'Roberson v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 381, 271 S.W.2d 663 (1954) (dictum).
s Ibid.
'Cases cited note 6 supra.
1"Simmons v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 153, 239 S.W.2d 625 (1951); Plasentilla v. State,
152 Tex. Crim. 618, 216 S.W.2d 187 (1948); Price v. State, - Tex. Crim. _ 199
S.W.2d 168 (1946); King v, State, 141 Tex. Crim. 257, 148 S.W.2d 199 (1941).
"See Mays v. State,- Tex. Crim. -, 320 S.W.2d 13 (1959); Johnson v. State,
Tex. Crim. - 305 S.W.2d 606 (1957); Jackson v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 323, 248
S.W.2d 748 (1952).
"Napier v. State, - Tex. Crim. -, 314 S.W.2d 102 (1958).
"Cases cited note 6 supra.
' De La Rosa v. State, - Tex. Crim. -, 317 S.W.2d 544 (1958); Prater v. State,
131 Tex. Crim. 35, 95 S.W.2d 971 (1936).
" Pena v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 311, 129 S.W.2d 667 (1939).
16 Cases cited note 6 supra.
"C Gases cited note 6 supra.
"SState v. Collins, 249 Iowa 989, 69 N.W.2d 31 (1955).
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that each case must be examined individually to determine if sub-
stantial prejudice has resulted." The anomolous situation may arise
whereby a consideration of evidence is harmless error if it is received
by the jury during deliberation and happens to be true. This result
would be in conflict with the harmless error concept which regards
error harmful if it is shown to prejudice substantially the defendant's
right." Thus, the recent trend culminating in the present case and
Mays v. State, viz., that the crucial element in determining whether
substantial prejudice was caused lies in the truth of the information
received, overlooks the fact that prejudice can be caused by the mere
receipt of information regardless of its accuracy."
The receipt of information regarding the pardon and parole laws
by the jury during its deliberations is capable of being prejudicial
regardless of the accuracy of the information received since jurors
may be prompted by parole information to recommend longer sen-
tences on the theory that the defendant would only serve a portion
of any sentence given. This information could be prejudicial even
though "true," since as a practical matter the defendant may have
to serve the longer sentence. Further, the formulation of a rigid
test based upon the truth of the information received leads to in-
equitable results. The complexity of the parole laws and the corres-
ponding need for flexibility in their administration would not render
feasible jury instruction as to these laws. Similarly, to instruct a
jury not to consider them would, while making their consideration
grounds for reversal on appeal, focus the individual juror's subjective
attention upon the very information not to be considered. The bet-
ter procedure would be for the court to abolish the rigid "truth
test" and to give close scrutiny to each record which involves the
possibility of prejudice in the jury's deliberations. This procedure
would lead the court out of the confusion which seems to have re-
sulted from the misinterpretation of the unfortunate "was untrue
or was harmful" dictum of the Roberson case.
Alan D. Feld
19See Deming v. State, 235 Ind. 282, 133 N.E.2d 51 (1955); State v. Nugent, 134
Iowa 237, 111 N.W. 927 (1907).
20 See Roberson v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 381, 271 S.W.2d 663 (1954); Simmons v. State,
156 Tex. Crim. 153, 239 S.W.2d 625 (1951); Price v. State, - Tex. Crim. -, 199
S.W.2d 168 (1946).
21 De La Rosa v. State, - Tex. Crim. -, 317 S.W.2d 544 (1958); Pena v. State,
37 Tex. Crim. 311, 129 S.W.2d 667 (1939).
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Evidence - Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence - Tactograph
P brought suit for the wrongful death of her husband, who was
killed when his automobile collided with D's truck, alleging that D's
driver was negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way, failing to
keep a proper lookout, and failing to operate his truck with proper
lights. The trial court, over P's objection, permitted D to introduce
the truck's tactograph into evidence. (A tactograph is an instrument
which records on a paper dial the speed of the vehicle on which it
is installed at any given time.) Held, reversed and remanded: A
"tactograph" is inadmissible where there is insufficient proof of its
accuracy and where its relevance is not established. Bell v. Kroger
Co., - Ark. -, 323 S.W.2d 424 (1959).
The admissibility of scientific matter in evidence is not of recent
origin. X-ray photographs, for example, were admitted as early as
1896.' Courts now permit a wide variety of scientific evidence to be
admitted in evidence, e.g., fingerprints,' results of the Harger breath
test for determining intoxication,' blood test results,4 urine analyses,'
radar speedmeters,' speedometers, and speed recorder tapes.' Gen-
erally, testimony based on scientific apparatus is admissible if (1)
the apparatus is accepted as dependable in the field of science in-
volved; (2) the particular apparatus used by the witness is in good
condition for accurate work; and (3) the witness using the appara-
tus as the source of his testimony is qualified for its use by training
and experience.' Moreover, even though the apparatus must be re-
garded as accurate and have gained general acceptance in the parti-
cular field in which it belongs, e the fact that some experts refuse
to recognize it as dependable," or that the instrument is not fool-
proof 1' does not preclude its admissibility. If there is any possibility
of error, it affects the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the
'Smith v. Grant, 29 Chicago Legal News 145 (1896); see also Scott, X-ray Pictures
as Evidence, 44 Mich. L. Rev. 773 (1946).
'People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. $34, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911).
3McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1950).
4Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J.Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
'State v. Stater, 242 Iowa 958, 48 N.W.2d 877 (1951).
eState v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955).
'City of Spokane v. Knight, 96 Wash. 403, 165 Pac. 105 (1917).
'Whitton v. Central of Georgia Ry., 89 Ga. App. 304, 79 S.E.2d 331 (1953).
'Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof 450 (3d ed. 1937). See also, Wilson v. State,
Tex. Crim. - 328 S.W.2d 311, 313 (1959).
"°Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
"McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1950).
"City of Spokane v. Knight, 96 Wash. 403, 165 Pac. 105 (1917).
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evidence. 3 Further, the trial court has wide discretion in determining
when the witness who utilizes the apparatus is an expert," and the
qualifications necessary for experts depend largely upon the subject
under investigation."
Instruments similar in mechanical operation to the tactograph have
been held admissible, e.g., discs of recorded conversations, s a speed-
recorder tape taken off a train after a collision, 7 and motion picture
films. 8 However, while several cases contain references to tacto-
graphs,'" the direct question of their admissibility has never been
decided.
The defendant in the instant case failed to prove that the particu-
lar tactograph which he sought to introduce was in accurate working
order; moreover, the tactograph evidence was irrelevant because the
plaintiff did not allege that the defendant's driver was speeding at
the time of the accident. Under these facts the court's rejection of
the tactograph was clearly correct." Nevertheless, the importance of
the instant case lies in the foundation which it may provide for the
admissibility of a tactograph in future cases. Although the court did
not discuss the scientific reliability of the tactograph, it seems to
have assumed that the instrument possesses the requisite reliability
and that it could be successfully introduced in a proper case." A
recent Texas decision contains a similar indication.2 In the Braun
case the court, applying the doctrine of spoliation," held that from
D's failure to introduce the tactograph from his truck or to explain
his failure to do so the jury could infer that the truck was travelling
at an excessive rate of speed at the time of the accident. 4 The clear
implication of this holding is that the court regarded the tactograph
as an accurate speed recorder. Buttressing the argument that the in-
strument is reliable are the results of a recent accuracy check by the
"State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955).
142 McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 1401 (2d ed. 1956).
:People v. Fiorita, 339 Ill. 78, 170 N.E. 690 (1930).
'6 Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 123 Conn. 218, 193 Atl. 765 (1937).7 Whitton v. Central of Georgia Ry., 89 Ga. App. 304, 79 S.E.2d 331 (1953).
'sHousewright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1950).
1State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955); Cooper v. Hoegland, 221
Minn. 446, 22 N.W.2d 450 (1946); Union Transports, Inc. v. Braun. 318 S.W.2d 927
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
"Cf. Wigmore, op cit. supra note 9, at 450.
2 323 S.W.2d at 426-27.
2Union Transports, Inc. v. Braun, 318 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
" The doctrine of spoliation creates a presumption that certain written instruments and
other objects which are under a party's control would not have aided his case when he
fails or refuses to produce such instruments or objects at the trial. See McCormick &
Ray, op. cit. supra note 14, at § 103.
24 Union Transports, Inc. v. Braun, 318 S.W.2d 927, 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); see
I McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 14, at § 103.
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National Truck Drivers Association,' which shows only a small
variation between the speed recorded on a tactograph and that re-
corded by radar.
It seems reasonable that the tactograph will ultimately be accorded
admissibility by the courts, although resolution of the question must,
of course, await the presentation of a proper case. Utilization of the
tactograph in tort litigation could be extensive, since many collision
cases depend upon proof (or lack of proof) of speed as the control-
ling ground of negligence. The tactograph would be of considerable
aid to juries in determining the negligence issues in these cases, and
hence recognition of its admissibility would be a desirable and pro-
gressive development in the law of evidence.
Jay Ungerman
Evidence - Hearsay Rule - Admissibility
of Hospital Records
An insurer appealed from a judgment for the beneficiary under
two burial policies, both of which contained a provision declaring
that the policy would not be in force unless delivered to the appli-
cant while he was alive and in good health. In defense, the insurer
had introduced at the trial evidence drawn from diagnostic recita-
tions in hospital records tending to show that the deceased applicant
had leukemia and thus was not in good health when the policies were
delivered. This evidence was excluded as hearsay. Held: The Texas
Business Records Act (which provides for the reception in evidence
of entries made in the regular course of business) authorizes the ad-
mission of hospital records which include the diagnosis of leukemia.
Travis Life Ins. Co. v. Rodriquez, 326 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) error ref. n.r.e.
The hearsay rule excludes evidence of a statement made out of
court when such evidence is offered for the purpose of proving the
truth of the previous statement.! The theory of the rule is that the
truth of the statement cannot be substantially guaranteed since (1)
the trier of the facts has no opportunity to determine the credibility
of the maker of the statement, (2) the statement is not made under
"See N.T.D.A. Conducts Test, The National Truck Drivers Magazine, July, 1957.
'I McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 781 (2d ed. 1956).
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oath, (3) there is no adequate opportunity for cross examination,
and (4) there is no protection against inaccurate transmission. How-
ever, many exceptions have been impressed upon the rule in situations
where there is a substantial guarantee of the truth.' One such excep-
tion allows the admission of business records when they satisfy cer-
tain requirements.4 The admissibility of business records initially was
confined to those of a commercial nature, but the modern trend
has been to include records of a non-commercial nature, such
as hospital records. Although the courts were slow to extend the
common-law exception for business records to hospital and doc-
tors' records, there was never much difficulty in admitting daily fac-
tual reports on the condition of the patient as long as the contents
of such records were within the personal knowledge of the doctor
or other hospital employee making the entry, and the records were
kept for use in treating the patient.6 Prior to the enactment of stat-
utes in this area, physicians' reports of examination and treatment, 7
as well as diagnoses,' were held admissible in evidence, but only when
verified by the persons making the entries.! This verification was re-
quired in an effort to guarantee the truthfulness of the record before
it was admitted,"0 but the Federal Business Records Act1 was enacted
to abolish such technical requirements." The reliability of the records
is said to come from their source and origin and the nature of their
compilation." Specifically, it is often argued that the truthfulness of
hospital records and physicians' reports is guaranteed by the fact that
persons in the medical profession are generally of high character, the
records are relied upon in matters of life and death, and they repre-
sent "automatic reflections of observations" on which competent doc-
tors would not differ.' Consequently, many courts refuse to extend
the exception to areas of complicated diagnoses such as psychiatry
wherein the courts have felt there is too much conjecture for the re-
sulting records to be admissible under the statute."
See I McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 1, § 782.
'See 2 McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 1, 55 1381-84.
SSee 2 McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 1, 55 1251-62. See also Ray, Three New
Rules of Evidence, 5 Sw. L.J. 381 (1951). See notes 18-24 infra.
s Ray, Business Records-A Proposed Rule of Admissibility, 5 Sw. L.J. 33 (1951).
66 Wigmore, Evidence § 1707 (3d ed. 1940).7 Adler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 F.2d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1929).
'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bullock, 59 F.2d 747 (S.D. Fla. 1932).
'Grossman v. Delaware Elec. Power Co., 34 Del. 521, 155 Atl. 806 (1929).
"°Globe Indemn. Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 137 At. 43 (1927).
1149 Stat. 1561 (1936), 28 U.S.C. § 695 (1940).
'Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 115 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1940).
"Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943).
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
" Id. at 303-05. See also Martinez v. Williams, 312 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958);
this view criticized in 2 McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1262.
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The Texas Business Records Act"6 was fashioned after several
"model" statutes in an effort to meet the demand for a progressive
and simplified rule of evidence in regard to the admissibility of busi-
ness records."' Notwithstanding a few modifications, the decisions
pertaining to physicians' reports and hospital records under article
3737e indicate trends similar to those in decisions construing the fed-
eral statute and other "model" acts. All that need be proved under
article 3737e is (1) that the record was made in the regular course
of business"8 or regular organized activity (whether conducted for
profit or not)," ° (2) that it was the regular course of that business
for an employee or representative of such business with personal
knowledge of the act, event or condition in question to make the
record or to transmit information thereof to be included in the re-
cord," and (3) that the record was made near enough in time to the
act recorded to be fresh in the memory of those taking part in the
act.1 The person who actually makes the entry must either have per-
sonal knowledge of the act recorded or have the information con-
cerning the act transmitted to him by a person who does have per-
sonal knowledge." However, the identity of the record and the mode
of its preparation may be proved by any qualified witness (e.g., the
entrant or custodian), and the fact that such witness has no personal
knowledge of the contents of the record is not grounds for exclusion,
but is only a factor in determining the weight and credibility-of the
record." As an additional requirement of proof, it has been suggested
in an analogous case that the employee or representative whose acts
give rise to the business record must be shown to be professionally
qualified before the record will be admitted. 4
The decision in the instant case emphasizes the need for the ex-
ception to the hearsay rule in favor of non-commercial business re-
cords." The court in the instant case distinguished Pan American Ins.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3737e (1951).
" Ray, supra note 5, at 44-45.
"Pan American Ins. Co. v. Couch, 305 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref.
n.r.e.
19 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3737e § 4 (1951). See also Morris v. Ratliff, 291 S.W.2d
418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3737e § 1(b) (1951).
21 Ray, supra note 4, at 384.
2'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3737e I 1(b) (1951).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3737e 5 2 (1951).
"4See Hartman v. Harder, 322 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) construing article
3731a, holding that before the report of an official and employee of the Department of
Public Safety concerning the alcoholic content of decedent's blood is admitted into evidence,
it must be shown that they are chemists or specialists in determining percentage of alcohol
in a sample of blood.
"See 2 McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1260.
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Co. v. Conch" because the records there were not shown to have been
made in the regular course of business, and therefore were correctly
excluded."7 Moreover, the court found it unnecessary to consider the
problem which would be presented by records containing highly con-
jectural diagnoses since the disease involved here was leukemia. How-
ever, the court did conclude that the majority of the court in New
York Ins. Co. v. Taylor"s would have allowed the records in the in-
stant case because, unlike the diagnosis of a psychoneurotic state, the
diagnosis of leukemia is not one about which competent physicians
would ordinarily differ. Accordingly, the opinion in the instant case
does not indicate how the Texas courts would now decide a case in-
volving records of controversial diagnoses, but it does indicate that
the courts are fully aware of the practical value of admitting medical
records under article 3737e.
The courts and the legislature must be constantly mindful of the
need for modification of outmoded rules of procedure and irrational
rules of evidence. The provisions of article 3737e and decisions like
the one in the instant case indicate an increased awareness of this
need with reference to hearsay evidence. Although the decision in the
instant case is completely adequate within the fact situation, many
problems such as the admission of records containing highly conjec-
tural diagnoses still remain unsettled. It seems unlikely that sporadic
judicial decisions can solve these problems as adequately as further
legislation. In prescribing exceptions to the rule, the value of the rule
itself should not be overlooked. Exceptions should be adopted only
in cases where truthfulness can be assured to a substantial degree,
but the hearsay rule with its exceptions should be flexible enough to
meet the advancements in business practices, specifically in the
field of medicine.
George Howard Nelson
305 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
27 It seems evident that the court in the Pan American case did not hold that the mere
fact that the doctor's report was hearsay made it inadmissible, for such a decision would
conflict with the whole objective of article 3737e.
"s 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
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Procedure - Special Issue Submission - Dual
Submission of Ultimate Issues
The plaintiff's decedent was killed in a crossing accident with the
defendant's train. The defendant alleged decedent's contributory ne-
gligence through violation of article 6701 (d), section 86(c), (d),'
which requires one approaching a crossing to stop when a train is
within hazardous proximity, and not proceed until he can do so
safely. The trial court submitted special issues inquiring whether de-
cedent failed to keep a proper lookout to the west before he turned
south, whether he failed to keep a proper lookout to the west while
within 40 feet of the tracks, whether he looked west before attempt-
ing to drive across the tracks, whether he failed to see the train be-
fore driving upon the tracks, and whether he saw the train before
driving upon the tracks. Held: "Shades" of proper lookout, even
though ultimate in themselves, should not be submitted separately
to the jury. Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Snider, -- Tex. -, 321 S.W.2d
280 (1959) (dictum).
Special issue submission asks the jury a specific question on each
controlling fact." In general, only relevant, ultimate, and disputed
fact issues supported by the pleadings should be submitted to the
jury.' "Relevant" and "disputed" present few problems; however,
Texas courts have experienced great difficulty in determining how
"ultimate" an issue must be before it may be submitted to the jury.4
The difficulty lies in distinguishing between "secondary root issues"
and "evidentiary issues."' Though an absolute, precise criterion for
determining which issues are "controlling" or "ultimate" is difficult,'
generally an issue which, standing alone, could constitute an essential
part of the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's affirmative
defense will be considered ultimate, though this definition does not
cover a rebuttal issue Thus, two problems arise in special issue sub-
mission, viz., a question may be "too ultimate," or, conversely, a
charge may contain so many issues that it becomes too voluminous
to be practicable and results only in confusing the jury."
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1948).
'Masterson, Preparation and Submission of Special Issues in Texas, 6 Sw. L.J. 163, 164
(1952); Speer, Law of Special Issues in Texas 17 (1931).
'2 Frumer & Masterson, Texas Courts 250 (rev. ed. 1959); Speer, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 20.
42 Frumer & Masterson, op. cit. supra note 3, at 251.
5 Ibid.
' Suggs, Jury Submission Under the New Rules, 6 Dallas Bar Speaks 229, 250 (1941);
Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas 100 (1959).




Assuming proper complaint is made in the trial court and that the
harmless error rule is inapplicable, an issue which is too general,' or
one which inquires about several different facts when each fact
should be the basis of a separate special issue,"0 will be reversed on
appeal. Further, trial courts properly may refuse to submit requested
issues which are only evidentiary in nature, although if a requested
issue rejected by the trial court as evidentiary is found on appeal
to be ultimate, the judgment will be reversed." Although reversal
frequently results from omission of an issue, it rarely results from
submitting too many issues1' since submission of too many issues is
not ground for reversal when it is not proved that the jury was con-
fused thereby.' Only one Texas case has been found reversing a
judgment on the objection that a number of submitted special issues
should have been submitted in a single group of questions."'
The court in the principal case stated that shades of proper look-
out, even though ultimate in themselves, should not be submitted,
but did not remand the case because this objection to submission of
multitudinous special issues covering various phases of proper lookout
was not preserved on appeal.1" Each party, in preparing a requested
charge, often includes too many issues presenting his various
theories of recovery or defense on the theory that the greater number
of issues he has included, the greater the probability that the jury
will answer some of them favorably to him, and the more requests
he has refused, the better his chances will be in claiming reversable
error if the judgment is against him. Too often the trial judge pre-
fers simply to grant the requests when in doubt or when no serious
complaint is made, 7 and there is little incentive to avoid this multi-
tudinous submission because the error involved is usually found to
' Blythe County Line Independent School Dist. v. Garrett, 232 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950).
"Buss v. Shepherd, 240 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.
" Gillam v. Baker, 195 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error dism. Also, several
disputed evidentiary issues may be properly grouped together when they "add up" to an
ultimate issue. See, e.g., Austin v. DeGeorge, 55 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error
dism.
"
2 North Texas Traction Co. v. Bruce, 77 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error
dism.
"See, Suggs, op. cit. supra note 6.
4 Tripp v. Watson, 235 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.; Inter-
national Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders & Helpers of America v. Huval, 154
S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), rev'd in part on other grounds, 140 Tex. 21, 166
S.W.2d 107 (1942).
'"Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
'l 321 S.W.2d at 284.
'Hodges, op. cit. supra note 6, at 134.
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be harmless'" and hence non-reversable. The court in the principal
case indicates that a case may be remanded if an appellate court finds
that multitudinous questions as to a material matter confused the
jury."9 This indication is in accord with Tripp v. Watson" and Inter-
national Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders & Helpers of Amer-
ica v. Huval" which, although commenting that repetition of issues
should not be tolerated, did not reverse because it was not shown
that confusion resulted. Moreover, trial judges will be assisted by
rule 279," which assures that judgments may not be reversed on ap-
peal due to failure to submit various phases or different shades of
one ultimate issue.
The process generally employed in preparing the charge tends to
enhance rather than reduce the number of issues. The rules contem-
plate that special issue submission will simplify and be a more scien-
tific approach to jury verdicts than the general charge. The court
in the principal case indicates an attitude that more nearly corres-
ponds with the theory of special issue submission and, in so doing,
issues a stern warning that trial courts and litigants should reduce
the number of issues in the charge by eliminating extra issues cov-
ering what is essentially a single fact. The court is to be commended
for this position which may help to eliminate jury confusion result-
ing from multitudinous special issues and bring about less appellate
reversals due to conflicts in answers to numerous special issues.
Henry Nuss, III
Procedure - Summary Judgment
Negligence Cases
P sued D for the wrongful death of her 15-year-old daughter who
was killed when she fell from the front fender of D's moving auto-
mobile. D moved for summary judgment contending that there was
no material issue of fact, and that the decedent was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. P did not file counter affidavits,
and the trial court sustained D's motion for summary judgment.
"8Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. rule 434 (1955); San Antonio Hermann Sons Home
Ass'n v. Harvey, 256 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.; Tripp v. Wat-
son, 235 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.
' 321 S.W.2d at 284.
20 Cases cited note 14 supra.
2 Cases cited note 14 supra.
"Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. (1955).
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Held, reversed and remanded: Issues concerning negligence, heedless-
ness or reckless conduct, and proximate cause are deemed questions
of "material fact" and are not the proper subject of a summary
judgment. Hammett v. Fleming, 324 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) error ref. n.r.e.
A summary judgment may be granted in actions where there is
no genuine issue of material fact and where the controversy has re-
solved itself into one purely of law.1 A motion for summary judg-
ment is presented in advance of a trial on the merits,' and the movant
has the burden of establishing that no factual controversy exists and
all that is involved is the application of the law to the facts.' Further,
all doubts as to the existence of material facts are resolved against
the movant.4 The purposes of summary judgment proceedings are to
expedite the administration of justice by avoiding needless trials,' to
enable one to obtain a judgment promptly by preventing the inter-
position of untenable defenses which cause delay,' and to relieve the
congested court dockets.! This procedure has been regarded as an ex-
treme remedy,' and one to be cautiously invoked.! Nonetheless, a case
may generally be decided on a motion for summary judgment if the
situation would justify a directed verdict in so far as the facts are
concerned."
Summary judgment procedure theoretically is applicable to all civil
actions with the exception of those actions which would be contrary
'Love v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 144, 104 F. Supp. 102 (1952); Gulbenkian v.
Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929 (1952); Toliver v. Bergmann, 297 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956).
Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 191 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1951); United
States v. Seppa, 12 F.R.D. 251 (D. Minn. 1952); 4 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in
District and County Courts S 17.26 (1950).
3SMS Mfg. Co. v. U.S.-Mengel Plywoods, 219 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1955); Jindra v.
Jindra, 267 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.; Lesikar v. Lesikar, 251
S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
'Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956); Jones v.
Gonzales, 326 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.
'Marks Music Corp. v. Continental Record Co., 222 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 861 (1955); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 292 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
'Caylor v. Virden, 217 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1955); Boucher v. Texas Turnpike Au-
thority, 317 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
'Note, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 515, 518 (1952); Legislation, 33 St. John's L. Rev. 414, 415
(1959).
'Hunt v. Pick, 240 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1957); Warner v. First Nat'l Bank, 236 F.2d
853 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956).
'Bowdidge v. Lehman, 252 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1958); Carantzas v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.,
235 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1956); Gibler v. Houston Post Co., 310 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Kaufman v. Blackman, 239 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951) error ref. n.r.e.
"Dewey v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Friedman v. Thomas J. Fisher &
Co., 88 A.2d 321 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952); McFarland v. Connally, 252 S.W.2d 486
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952); see Neigut v. McFadden, 257 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
error ref. n.r.e. But see authorities cited note 13 infra.
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to public policy, e.g., the policy against collusive divorces.11 However,
there is federal authority for the proposition that issues of negligence
ordinarily are not susceptible of summary adjudication either for or
against the claimant but should be resolved by a trial on the merits."2
Thus, in federal negligence cases it has been held that even though
the judge is of the opinion that he will subsequently direct a verdict,
he should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct the verdict rather
than attempt to try the case in advance on a motion for summary
judgment;" but, the federal courts will render a summary judgment
for the defendant where the plaintiff's claim clearly lacks substance
because there is a lack of negligence by defendant or the defendant's
negligence does not rise to the degree of negligence necessary for re-
covery.' Moreover, where the plaintiff is the movant, a summary
judgment has been granted in the federal courts if there is negligence
per se." Although the Texas summary judgment procedure" was
adopted from the federal summary judgment procedure,' the Texas
courts, in contrast with some federal decisions, have granted a sum-
mary judgment to the defendant on the issues of negligence in only
one reported case."
The court in the principal case seems to base its decision on the
theory that, in an action of negligence, issues of fact are always pre-
sented which should be left to a jury." Since the courts must rely on
the facts of each case and the rules established by similar cases, they
have a wide discretion in determining what is a controverted fact,"
although the test for determining whether a fact is in controversy
is applied more strictly in negligence cases than in other types of
" McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 Texas L. Rev. 285 (1952); Comment, 2 Baylor
L. Rev. 320, 322 (1950); 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1231
(1958).
"Aetna Ins. Co. v. Cooper Wells Co., 234 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1956); 6 Moore's Fed-
eral Practice § 56:17(42) (2d ed. 1953).
"Kirkpatrick v. Consolidated Underwriters, 227 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1955); Pierce v.
Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951).
'"Roucher v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1956); Surkin v. Char-
teris, 197 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1952); Wilkinson v. Powell, 149 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1945);
Hufner v. Erie Ry. Co., 26 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1309
(1955).
"American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
"Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. rule 166-A (1955).
"7Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
"Perez v. Hernandez, 317 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e. There
have been no reported Texas cases found wherein a plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment on the issues of negligence has been granted.
"9 324 S.W.2d at 74.
"0 Pen-Ken Gas & Oil Corp. v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 800 (1943); Burkett v. Panama City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 93
So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1957).
1960]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
actions. 1 Courts have relied on various reasons for denying a sum-
mary judgment in negligence cases, e.g., the difficulty of getting any
significant agreement as to the facts because summary judgment
denies a party the right to cross-examine witnesses,"a the view that
the "reasonable man" test should be left to the jury even when the
facts are undisputed,"3 and the theory that a party should not be
denied his day in court." While the movant has the burden of show-
ing that there is no disputed material fact alleged by the opposing
party," in a Texas negligence case even meeting this burden may not
be sufficient to entitle him to a summary judgment.
Under the present law in Texas it seems futile to move for a sum-
mary judgment in a negligence case. The overcautious approach of
the courts in summary judgment proceedings has, for all practical
purposes, excepted negligence cases from a procedure made applicable
to all civil actions by the rules of procedure. Thus, even though a
directed verdict may be granted later on the same evidence, some
courts would rather have the case tried in the courtroom atmosphere
than grant the motion for summary judgment. This approach,
whether justified or not, seems inconsistent with the purpose of the
summary judgment proceedings, and has resulted in uncertainty as
to when the procedure is applicable. If the object of the summary
judgment procedure is to be effectuated, this uncertainty should be
removed by the courts relaxing their extremely cautious approach to
summary judgment in negligence cases or by amending the summary
judgment procedure so as to exclude negligence cases. It is believed
that the former solution should be adopted, for it is becoming im-
perative that a method be provided for reducing the presently con-
gested court dockets.
David E. Varner
"Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 224 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1955); Estepp v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 192 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1951); Pattison v. Highway
Ins. Underwriters, 292 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Loud v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 262 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
aaRoucher v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1956); Dulansky v.
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 191 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1951); Dunn v. Tillman, 255 S.W.2d
933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Bauman, A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 Ind. L. J.
467, 499 (1958).
aaRamsouer v. Midland Valley Ry., 135 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1943); Bimberg v. North-
ern Pac. Ry., 217 Minn. 187, 14 N.W.2d 410 (1944); see Allen v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
315 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Bauman, supra note 22;
3 Barron & Holtzoff, op. cit. supra note 11.
"Union Transfer Co. v. Riss & Co., 218 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1955); Ford v. Luria
Steel & Trading Corp., 192 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1951); see Loud v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
262 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
22O'Quinn v. Scott, 251 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
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Taxation - Texas Inheritance Tax - Transfers
Taking Effect at Death
The settlor created an irrevocable trust reserving the income for
her life and retaining a power to invade the corpus if necessary for
her support. Upon the settlor's death the trust was to terminate, and
the corpus and undistributed income were to be distributed in the
following manner: to the settlor's daughter if living; if the daughter
was not living, to the petitioner, the daughter's husband at the time
the trust was created; if the petitioner was not living, then to the
settlor's heirs. After the daughter's death, the petitioner remarried
and was divorced just before the settlor died. Since it was held that
the petitioner's remarriage, notwithstanding his subsequent divorce,
removed him from a lower tax bracket afforded a "husband of a
daughter"' and placed him into a higher tax bracket applicable to
persons unrelated to the settlor, the petitioner contended that for
purposes of the Texas inheritance tax, his status should be deter-
mined as of the time of the execution of the trust instrument (at
which time he was clearly the husband of the settlor's daughter).
Held: For inheritance tax purposes, the status of an irrevocable trust
beneficiary who has an alternative contingent remainder' is to be de-
termined at the time of the settlor's death rather than at the time of
the execution of the trust instrument. Cahn v. Calvert, - Tex. -'
321 S.W.2d 869 (1959).
The transfer of an irrevocable trust with a life income reserved
by the settlor which takes effect in possession or enjoyment at or af-
ter the settlor's death is included within the settlor's estate for fed-
eral estate tax purposes,' and a beneficiary of the trust is taxed for
state inheritance tax purposes according to the portion of the trust
received by him.' This statement reflected the unquestioned law prior
to 1930, but in that year, the famous decision in May v. Heiner' ex-
cluded such a trust from the federal estate tax based on the reasoning
that since the trust was irrevocable, the interest in it passed upon its
execution, and nothing remained to be transferred upon the settlor's
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7118 (1951) ("Class A").
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 7122 (1951) ("Class E").
'Alternative because two contingent events were necessary before petitioner could take
an interest in the trust property-the death of the settler before the death of petitioner's
wife, and the death of petitioner's wife before his death.
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 2037; First Trust Co. v. Kelm, 105 F. Supp. 667 (D. Minn.
1952).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7118 (1951); In re Townsend's Estate, 349 Pa. 162,
36 A.2d 438 (1944); In re Leffmann's Estate, 312 Pa. 236, 167 Atl. 343 (1933).
8281 U.S. 238 (1930).
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death. This was the Supreme Court's view whether the beneficial in-
terest created was vested or contingent.' When some state courts re-
fused to apply the May v. Heiner principle to state inheritance tax
cases involving trusts with life incomes retained,' there resulted a seri-
ous conflict of authority which was not resolved until the Court
abruptly overruled itself in Commissioner v. Estate of Church." The
Texas case of Bethea v. Sheppard," is representative of near-unani-
mous state court views approving the opinion in the Church case.
Since May v. Heiner stressed the time of execution of the irrevocable
trust instrument as the moment when all interest in the trust passed,
while the Church case relied on the settlor's death as the time of pass-
ing of the trust property, the emergence of the latter case as the pre-
vailing view" has provided strong support for the idea that the inci-
dence of a state inheritance tax on an irrevocable trust beneficiary is
at the time of the settlor's death rather than the time of execution of
the trust instrument.
Texas has a scaled inheritance tax with rates and exemptions based
on the taxpayer's relationship to the deceased." Unlike the federal
estate tax which is imposed upon the right of the grantor to transfer
property, a state inheritance tax is levied upon the right to receive
or succeed to the possession or enjoyment of property and is assessed
against the beneficiary of the estate.' Regarding the time when the
incidence of the tax is determined, the most important factor is
whether the interest is vested or contingent at the time of execution
of the trust instrument." The decisions are practically unanimous
that the incidence of a tax upon a transfer of an interest in an ir-
revocable trust (when settlor retains a life income) is at the time of
the settlor's death whenever the interests created thereby remain
contingent in title until the time of the settlor's death." The more
'Compare Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931) with May v. Heiner,
281 U.S. 238 (1930).
'See Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Co., 114 Conn. 207, 158 Atl. 245 (1932), aff'd, 287
U.S. 109 (1933).
'335 U.S. 632 (1949).
'o 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.
"See authorities cited notes 16 and 18 infra.
"
2 See Mahany, Texas Taxes 869 (1946).
1"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7117-7122 (1951).
"Bethea v. Sheppard, 143 S.W.2d 997, 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.
" Rottschaefer, Taxation of Transfers Taking Effect at Grantor's Death, 26 Iowa L.
Rev. 541 (1941). However, it should be pointed out that the recent trend is toward stress-
ing the time of the actual passing of economic benefits in determining when the incidence
of the tax occurs. See authorities cited note 19 infra.
"Miller v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 144, 112 A.2d 202 (1955); People v. Northern Trust
Co., 330 Ill. 238, 161 N.E. 525 (1928); In re Bass' Estate, 200 Okla. 14, 190 P.2d 800
(1947); Hickox v. Boyd, - Tenn. -, 321 S.W.2d 549 (1959); Bethea v. Sheppard,
143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.
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difficult problem results from interests that are vested at the time
of execution of the trust instrument. A widely-accepted earlier view
held that such a transfer was governed in all respects by the circum-
stances involved when the instrument of transfer was executed."'
The more recent cases which have established a contrary view in
holding that the time of settlor's death controls (and this may now
be called the majority view)"s have undoubtedly been influenced by
the present trend toward placing emphasis upon the shifting of eco-
nomic benefits as the significant factor in determining when the in-
cidence of the tax actually occurs."'
Since the court in the principal case reasoned that a beneficiary
who has only an alternative contingent remainder in an irrevocable
trust at the time of execution does not have a sufficiently vested in-
terest to enable a determination of his taxable status until the settlor's
death, their opinion coincides with the near-unanimous view and
also with the case of first impression on this point in Texas, Bethea
v. Sheppard.2" An important factor in the court's opinion is that
they explicitly refrain from stating what would be their holding in
a case in which the trust beneficiary had a vested rather than a con-
tingent remainder.21 However, a logical analysis of the vested re-
mainder issue reveals that just as with the contingent remainder,
death of the settlor is the all-important event.22 This analysis is based
on the reasoning that an estate is "vested" when there is an immedi-
ate fixed right of present or future enjoyment.2 There is a vesting
in interest and possession when a fixed right of present enjoyment
exists, but a vesting in interest alone when a present right of future
enjoyment exists. 4 Consequently, the creation of an irrevocable trust
(including a vested remainder) produces a vesting in interest, and
vesting in possession occurs upon the death of the settlor." Thus,
it is death which is the operative event that brings about the vest-
ing in possession and coming into enjoyment and so perfects the full
1 E.g., Chambers v. Gibb, 186 Cal. 196, 198 Pac. 1032 (1921); In re Meehan's Estate,
100 Misc. 246, 166 N.Y.S. 623 (1917); In re Houston's Estate, 276 Pa. 330, 120 Ati. 267
(1923).
"' See, e.g., Rising's Estate v. State ex rel. Benson, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N.W. 459 (1932);
CCH Inh., Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (7th ed.) 1560 D (1950).
"In re Kohrs' Estate, 122 Mont. 145, 199 P.2d 856 (1948); In re Wallace's Estate,
131 Ore. 597, 282 Pac. 760 (1929).
20 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.
21 321 S.W.2d at 872.
22 In re Kohrs' Estate, 122 Mont. 145, 199 P.2d 856 (1948).
2'Hignett v. Sherman, 75 Colo. 64, 224 Pac. 411 (1924).
24 Ziegler v. Love, 185 N.C. 40, 115 S.E. 887 (1923).




fee simple title in the remainderman.2 Had the court pursued this
rationale, there would be little question as to how Texas would hold
when a vested remainder is created by the execution of an irrevoca-
ble trust. Since our inheritance tax is an excise upon the right to re-
ceive, and a tax imposed upon transfers intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death is a tax upon a transfer
used as a substitute for testamentary dispositions, the logic of mak-
ing the moment of death the time for determining status becomes
apparent."
The earlier view which accrued a tax for inheritance tax purposes
at the time of the execution of the trust instrument may be said to
accord more nearly with the technical interpretation of the language
of the taxing provisions than does the view which accrues the tax
at the time of the settlor's death. Further, a determination of the
beneficiary's taxable status at the time of the execution of the trust
instrument is in keeping with the probable intent of the settlor.
On the other hand, the emphasis recently placed upon the shifting
of economic benefits as the significant factor in determining ques-
tions of taxation has strengthened judicial support of the majority
view that the settlor's death is the time for tax accrual, and it is
unfortunate that the Texas Supreme Court based its decision solely
upon the older standard, i.e., the distinction between vested and con-
tingent remainders. Moreover, it is quite clear that the settlor's death
was the intended prerequisite to the estate's coming into being for
the beneficiary, and effected the transmission from the dead to the
living which satisfied the terms of the taxing act and justified the
tax imposed. Although the court in the instant case states that it
will not decide at this time how it would hold in a case concerning
an irrevocable trust with a beneficiary having a vested interest at
the time the trust was created, it can be expected that the majority
view would be adopted and the "passing" referred to in the Texas
statutes would occur at the time of death.
Rice M. Tilley Jr.
"eRising's Estate v. State ex rel. Benson, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N.W. 459 (1932).
"'See Crocker v. Shaw, 174 Mass. 266, 54 N.E. 549 (1899).
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Torts - Negligence - Guest Statute
Shortly after P accepted a ride in D's automobile, D began to drive
at an excessive speed and P became afraid for her safety. When the
car went off the road and overturned, P was injured. At the trial P
introduced evidence that, although she repeatedly protested and de-
manded to be let out of the car, her pleas were ignored. The court
not only charged the jury on gross negligence (required under the
Florida guest statute) but also on simple negligence, on the theory
that if P had reasonably protested and demanded to be let out of the
car, the jury could find that she was not a guest within the meaning
of the statute. The jury brought in a general verdict for P. Held:
When a guest, who consents to ride in an automobile with no prior
knowledge or suspicion of the driver's intoxication or improper driv-
ing habits, becomes afraid for his safety because of the driver's dan-
gerous driving, and protests to the driver and demands to be let out
of the automobile, his status is no longer that of a guest; accordingly,
the driver owes the passenger the duty of reasonable care for his safe-
ty. Andrews v. Kirk, 106 So. 2d 110 (Fla. App. 1958).
At common law the driver of a vehicle owed to passengers the
duty of reasonable care in the operation of the vehicle, and was liable
to them for injuries proven to be the proximate result of his negli-
gence.' However, more than ordinary negligence has been a case-law
requirement in some states, on the theory that the guest is a mere li-
censee, or that the driver owes only the duty of a gratuitous bailee.'
Moreover, about half the states have adopted a so-called guest statute,
changing the common-law rule by requiring a greater degree of fault
before a guest can recover from his host, e.g., gross negligence, ' wil-
ful and wanton misconduct,' or heedlessness or reckless disregard for
the rights of others.' The intention of the various legislatures in en-
acting these statutes was to prevent the seemingly unfair result of a
guest recovering from his host for ordinary negligence,' and the de-
sire to prevent collusive lawsuits between an insured host and his pas-
senger.' These statutes typically bring "guests" and "passengers with-
'Perkins v. Galloway, 194 Ala. 265, 69 So. 875 (1915); Central Copper Co. v. Kle-
fisch, 34 Ariz. 230, 270 Pac. 629 (1928); Bauer v. Griess, 105 Neb. 381, 181 N.W. 156
(1920).
'Wilder v. Steel Products Co., 57 Ga. 255, 195 S.E. 226 (1938).
3Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917).
'Vt. Stats. Ann. tit. 23 § 1491 (1959).
'Wyo. Stats. Ann. S 31-233 (1957).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701b (1948); see Note, 1 Wyo. L.J. 182 (1947).
'Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940).
'Johnson v. Smither, 116 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.; Shea v.
Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936).
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out payment" within their application, but provide little or no fur-
ther definition of a guest.' Courts generally agree that a passenger
paying some compensation may be a guest, as where he merely con-
tributes to the expenses of a pleasure trip;" conversely, even if the
passenger confers some definite and tangible benefit on the owner,
not necessarily money, as where he is a prospective purchaser from
the owner, he may not be a guest."
In jurisdictions which have a guest statute, protests and demands
to be let out of the car, made by one who began the journey as a
guest, have met with divergent treatment by the courts. The fact that
a guest protested to the host about his improper driving has been
held to be evidence of wilfull and wanton misconduct;" other courts
have held that mere protest without a demand to leave the car does
not change the passenger's status.1 In some states, including Texas,
protests by a guest go to the question of showing lack of contribu-
tory negligence or assumption of risk, but do not alter the guest stat-
us of the passenger. 4 In cases where both a protest and a demand to
be let out of the car have been made, some courts have avoided the
question of a change of status of the passenger by finding the protest
and demand evidence of gross negligence." Moreover, it has been held
that a passenger's guest status is not changed where his request to be
released was based on convenience rather than fear of injury. 6
In the principal case, since the court had to affirm or reject the trial
court's charge on simple negligence, it was directly confronted with
the question of whether the status of a passenger may be changed.
In upholding the charge, the court reasoned that neither the wording
of the statute nor the policy behind it required a construction that
all invited riders must come within the statute. Further, the court
held that the words "guest" and "passenger," as used in the statute,"'
are synonymous to the extent that they imply the voluntary partici-
pation of the rider, i.e., with his consent or not under duress. In the
'See Note, 3 Wyo. L.J. 225 (1949).
"°Barnard v. Heather, 135 Neb. 513, 282 N.W. 534 (1938); Young v. Bynum, 260
S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
"McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937); Dahl v. Moore, 101 Wash.
503, 297 Pac. 218 (1931).
"Jones v. Melvin, 293 Mass. 9, 199 N.E. 392 (1936).
"Wachtel v. Block, 43 Ga. App. 756, 160 S.E. 97 (1931); Schlacter v. Harbin, 273
Mich. 465, 263 N.W. 431 (1935); Hayes v. Brower, 39 Wash.2d 372, 235 P.2d 482
(1951).
'"Napier v. Mooneyham, 94 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error dism.; see Taylor
v. Taug, 17 Wash.2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943).
"5Berman v. Berman, 110 Conn. 169, 147 Atl. 568 (1929); Manser v. Eder, 263 Mich.
107, 248 N.W. 563 (1933).
"See, e.g., Vance v. Grohe, 223 Iowa 1109, 274 N.W. 902 (1937).
"Fla. Stat. Ann. 5 320.59 (1958).
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instant case, the Florida court, the third to decide this precise ques-
tion, adopted the holding in Blanchard v. Ogletree," which allowed
a change in status brought about by the protest and demand to be
let out under similar circumstances. The principal case, however, ex-
pressly conditions the limits of permissible changes in status to situa-
tions in which the passenger can prove that he had no advance notice
of conditions which would produce improper driving, that his pro-
tests to the manner of driving were ignored, and that his demands to
be let out because of a real and reasonable fear of injury were refused
by the driver. Neither a protest alone nor a request based on reasons
of convenience where there is no reason for the guest to fear bodily
-harm is sufficient. These cases are contrary to Akins v. Hemphill,'
which did not allow a change of status in a fact situation which had
all of the elements of the principal case and which met the strict
limitations enumerated. The Washington court in Akins relied on its
earlier opinion in Taylor v. Taug" (in which the guest knew the
host was intoxicated before she entered the car and there was no evi-
dence showing that the host heard the demand to be released), par-
ticularly the language in Taylor where the court said that "the only
purpose of the consideration of the question of protest was whether
or not the evidence showed the guest was guilty of contributory ne-
gligence in riding with a reckless driver . . . When Appellant ac-
cepted a ride with respondent, she became a guest for the entire
journey. To hold otherwise would nullify the plain meaning of the
host-guest statute."" ' Washington allows recovery only if the acci-
dent was "intentional,"2 and the Akins court, admitting the harsh-
ness of their rule, seems to be preoccupied with the danger of col-
lusion."
As limited, the decision in the present case provides a workable
rule of recovery for those who enter a car as a guest and later wish
to withdraw, but cannot because of their lack of control of the situ-
ation. After an injury under such circumstances, a passenger cannot
be morally wrong, or "biting the hand that feeds him," if he seeks
recovery from the driver, having both given warning of impending
danger and withdrawn his consent. Objective evidence is necessary
for recovery, which reduces the opportunity for collusion, but the
fact that the possibility for colluison exists or is made easier by the
1841 Ga. App. 4, 152 S.E. 116 (1930).
19 33 Wash.2d 735, 207 P.2d 195 (1949).
20 17 Wash. 2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943).
"1 136 P.2d at 179.
2Akins v. Hemphill, 33 Wash. 2d 735, 207 P.2d 195 (1949).
" See also Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936).
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rule in the principal case" does not outweigh the desirability of per-
mitting a change in status where the passenger has shown that he
tried to exercise his right to be released and that he had reasonable
cause for fear of bodily harm. Accordingly, since the concept of a
guest is based on a consensual relationship which no longer exists,
the rule in the principal case, permitting recovery for ordinary neg-
ligence, seems to be the better reasoned rule.a
Franklin H. Perry
24 For example, the host could agree that his guest made protests and demands.
25For a thorough analysis of the Texas Guest Statute, see Comment, 14 Sw. L.J. 72
(196o).
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